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In search of social equipoise
A failure to acknowledge uncertainty about the effectiveness of social interventions is a major barrier
to evidence based public policy making. M Petticrew and colleagues argue that we need to develop
and apply the concept of social equipoise
M Petticrew professor , M McKee professor , K Lock senior lecturer , J Green professor , G Phillips
research fellow
Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1H 9SH, UK
Randomised controlled trials are common in medicine but less
so in other fields. However, the use of trials in medicine is
helped by an open acknowledgment of uncertainty about
effectiveness—that is, clinical equipoise. In theory the same
should also apply to social interventions (such as public
policies), but no concept of “social equipoise” exists. This makes
it politically difficult for policy makers to acknowledge
uncertainty and to conduct evaluations. The development of
“social equipoise” may help foster a greater culture of evaluation
outside medicine. This may be particularly important in England
now that public health has moved from the control of primary
care trusts to local authorities, which are influenced by party
politics.
Equipoise and the role of randomised
trials
The randomised controlled trial is often described as the “gold
standard” for evaluating clinical interventions,1 and its use has
increasingly been advocated in other sectors such as international
development and social policy.2 Although its roots are in the
social sciences rather than medicine, it is rare for it to be used
to evaluate innovations in public policy.3 For example, the
number of randomised trials identified by the Campbell
Collaboration, covering education, social welfare, crime, and
justice, is a small fraction of the number in the Cochrane
Collaboration, with its focus on health.4 The reasons for this are
the subject of debate but include perceptions that trials are costly
and pose practical and ethical difficulties. One recent report for
the UK’s Cabinet Office challenged several such arguments and
included another possible explanation: that policy makers often
think that they already know the answer.4 However, it did not
explicitly consider why they fail to accept that the answer is not
known or, in the parlance of clinical trials, that there is
equipoise.
Indeed, discussion of equipoise outside clinical trials seems
rare, even though it is now widely accepted in clinical research
as a key way of determining what Chiong has called “the social
merit and therapeutic acceptability” of a clinical trial.5 Thus,
although previous discussions of the lack of randomised trials
in public policy usually focus on practical, ethical, and
methodological challenges, the acknowledgment of uncertainty
may be just as important a driver to improve the evidence base.
Clinical equipoise exists when there is no consensus about the
comparative merits of the alternatives to be tested.6 Equipoise
is a prerequisite for a randomised trial. Miller and Joffe note,
“Physicians can ethically randomly assign patients to treatments
provided that equipoise—a state of professional uncertainty
about their relative therapeutic merits—exists. If equipoise
exists, no participant in a randomized clinical trial is knowingly
given inferior treatment.”7 Mann also sees the existence of
equipoise as creating an imperative to conduct a trial, arguing
that “Equipoise motivates clinical experts to propose
randomized, controlled trials to resolve uncertainties about the
relative merits of interventions.”8
Reasons for lack of discussion of social
equipoise
In public health policy research the concept of equipoise or even
uncertainty may not be salient for several reasons:
Lack of evidence on variations in practice and outcomes—Even
a few decades ago the concept of uncertainty was not widely
accepted in clinical medicine. Many treatments were adopted
on the basis of experience, with no attempt to evaluate them
rigorously. This approach was rendered unsustainable by
evidence of the extent of variation in practice, which gained
prominence with the work of Wennberg and colleagues in the
1980s.9 10 In contrast, there is much less research documenting
variations in public policy and what exists is often between
countries, where it is easy to dismiss differences as being due
to unspecified national differences. Where variations in public
policy are identified, they are often argued to be appropriate
responses to variations in need or context.
Multiplicity of outcomes—In complex social interventions there
are more likely to be multiple equally important outcomes. This
makes the concept of equipoise hard to apply because although
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some stakeholders may agree that there is uncertainty around
one outcome, others may feel that there is no real uncertainty
around the outcomes they would prioritise. Moreover,
“superiority” of one outcome is more difficult to determine and
identification of a primary outcome may even be seen as bad
research practice because it excludes the values of certain
stakeholders.11 Thus, urban regeneration programmes, which
are often cited as social interventions aimed at improving health,
are intended to bring about a range of outcomes, of which health
is only one, and not usually the primary one from a policy
perspective.12 Other outcomes include improvements in the
physical environment, employment opportunities, and reductions
in crime, and all these may be more important to various
stakeholders such as local politicians and the people who live
in the area. The outcomes that policy makers value may also
depend on their political persuasion—for example, reductions
in inequalities may be less important to those on the political
right than on the left.13
Policy makers or practitioners are unwilling to admit
uncertainty—Even when policy makers believe there is genuine
equipoise, they may not be able to admit this publicly for
political reasons, particularly when “doing nothing” is not an
option. Furthermore, individual values and political beliefs may
shape the way that evidence is evaluated and used. In one US
study, registered Democrats who were given evidence on the
social determinants of diabetes were more likely to support
social intervention than those whowere not; however, registered
Republicans given the same evidence were less likely to support
intervention.14 Political beliefs can also contribute to
confirmation bias, when decision makers seek out evidence
consistent with their views and disregard that which contradicts
it.15
Lack of evidence—The current evidence base makes equipoise
difficult to “see.” In a field where there is a lot of robust
evidence, it may be easier to determine whether you are in
equipoise about any particular decision. When the evidence
base is very complex, and partial, however, it can be difficult
to be clear about whether equipoise exists, or whether equipoise
is the appropriate position to adopt—for example, there may be
equipoise around the health outcomes but not around the social
outcomes.
Difficulties with the concept of equipoise
The concept of equipoise is not without critics: Miller and Joffe
raise several arguments against it as the arbiter of the ethical
legitimacy of randomised trials to evaluate new treatments,
including imprecision in defining the concept, the reliance on
expert opinion to determine when equipoise exists, and the
limitations of determining efficacy on the basis of surrogate
outcomes.7 It may also be particularly difficult to apply in social
interventions, where the equipoise is around indirect health
effects (such as respiratory health in the case of improvements
to social housing) but the primary economic or social effects
seem certain.16 In this case equipoise may be unlikely and
randomisation may even be unethical.17
Another difficulty is that the way that problems are constructed
in public health and local government is different from the way
that they are constructed in clinical settings, so that equipoise
does not exist or is not seen as essential. Some local government
activities entail responding to local problems with actions whose
impact can be easily determined without perfect evidence. The
actions they take to improve community safety—for example,
changing policing strategies to target antisocial behaviour—may
be based on the accumulation of calls, reports, or observations
from a geographical location. It is much easier to see in such a
situation whether something has “worked” (setting aside the
problem of confounding and the counterfactual—whether the
situation may have improved anyway or something else might
have worked better) if the problem goes away once action is
taken. This is very different from, for example, determining
whether action taken to reduce rates of coronary heart disease
in an area has worked, where the time to outcome is long, and
the causal chains are complex and non-linear.
Legitimising uncertainty
However, aside from these difficulties a strong case can bemade
for developing a general concept of equipoise in the case of
social interventions and policies. This might start by the
legitimisation of uncertainty. Uncertainty about a course of
action may help foster a culture of evaluation and make it
politically easier for randomised trials (as well as other
evaluations) of policies to be conducted. In one such example,
Camden Council, in London, recognised that there was genuine
uncertainty about the effect of a boiler management system
aimed at reducing hot water temperatures and heating bills. As
well as its effect on heating bills, the council wanted to know
whether it would reduce scalds or result in people making more
use of kettles to heat water, increasing the risk of spills. To
answer these questions a cluster randomised trial in 22 social
housing estates was conducted, which showed that scalds were
indeed reduced but there was no effect on heating bills.18
The argument for a concept of social equipoise was made by
the evaluation guru Donald Campbell (though he does not refer
to it as equipoise) in his seminal paper “Reforms as
Experiments” in 1969.19 In it he discusses the difficulty of
evaluating the effects of US policy reforms (box). He
acknowledges that evaluating outcome is politically risky
because it holds the decision maker up to scrutiny and can prove
that an intervention supported with public money does not work,
at least with respect to the outcomes evaluated. However,
Campbell argues that a wider understanding, acknowledgement,
and acceptance of the concept of equipoise in public policy
would facilitate evaluation and learning and what he calls the
“honest evaluation of outcomes.”
The move of public health in England to local authorities could
facilitate this process. There are many areas within local
authority control where there is a need for further evaluation,
such as approvals of late night licensing, implementation of 20
mph zones, or funding breakfast clubs for schoolchildren. Such
interventions might have a substantial effect on public health
and other outcomes20-22 but can be controversial. Openness about
uncertainty and clarity about the outcomes that are expected
would facilitate rigorous evaluation. The transfer of public health
staff, who are sensitised to evaluation and trained in its
application and interpretation, could encourage this process, but
it is too early to know if this will happen. Early indications
suggest that the public health capacity and political interest in
it at local level may be extremely variable. Research on local
government policy making before 1974, when much of the
public health function moved into the NHS, suggests that
political ideology, and the misplaced sense of certainty that
accompanies it, may dominate decision making.23 One recent
commentator has, for example, pointed to the difference between
public health and political timescales: “Public health staff used
to thinking in terms of policies which will take many years to
demonstrate their effectiveness will need to understand how the
three or four-year electoral cycle dominates the thinking of their
political bosses.”24
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Reforms as experiments
“It is one of the characteristics of the present situation that specific reforms are advocated as though they were certain to be successful . .
. This predicament, abetted by public apathy and by deliberate corruption, may prove in the long run to permanently preclude a truly
experimental approach to social amelioration . . . by making explicit that a given problem solution was only one of several that an administrator
or party could in good conscience advocate, and by having ready a plausible alternative, the administrator could afford honest evaluation
of outcomes”
Donald Campbell19
Academic debates about the lack of rigorous evidence to support
policy making often consider only the methodological
arguments. However, fostering a culture of evidence production
and use is not simply a matter of disseminating methodology
to non-academic colleagues. In this case, developing the concept
of “social” equipoise may make it easier for decision makers to
conduct new evaluations; may help them think of the conditions
in which new trials are needed; and may help reduce what
Campbell calls policy makers’ “excess of commitment” to
particular positive outcomes.
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